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In some contexts, like for example complex games and puzzles, the search of
solutions for problems leads to discover different procedures, none of which can be
considered “the best” one. In these contexts, in fact,  the different  solutions can be
compared only in some specific well known domain of application, while in other
domains the comparison is incomplete or vague, or the domain may have imperfectly
known  boundaries: it is therefore impossible to put the different procedures in a
precise preference order over the entire domain of applicability. Moreover these
procedures may be “locally stable”  because small local changes in the instructions
that define them do not lead to any improvement, and therefore individuals that
discover one solution may remain locked in it without trying to search alternative
solutions.
The search of solutions in puzzles shows striking analogies with the search of new
theoretical approaches that take place when a consolidated theory fails to explain new
phenomena.  The properties of search in puzzles – multiplicity, local stability  and
incompleteness of solutions – also affect the new theoretical approaches, i.e. the new
solutions to a scientific puzzle, that emerge challenging a dominant theory.
The state of the art of new theoretical proposals in the field of  decision-making
interestingly illustrates this situation. After the numerous violations of traditional
expected utility theory discovered since the experiments by Maurice Allais (1952),
new theoretic proposals, such as prospect theory, regret theory, and others, have
contended with it for the status of the “right” theory. To date, comparisons among the
competing theoretical proposals has singled out none of them as unequivocally
preferable. (Hey 1991)
This situation, which has persisted for many years, prompts explanations which work
in two directions: on the one hand, it suggests that epistemological elements relating
to the existence and permanence of competing theories should be rethought; on the
other, it suggests that cognitive aspects of human thinking should be examined in
order to explain why alternative solutions to a problem may persist and stabilize and
thereby provide a cognitive foundation for decision theory.
The paper explores mainly the last question. The stability of “cognitive traps” is
analyzed within the formal framework of the theory of problem solving. The core of
the discussion will be based on analysis of the process by which players in complex
games construct solutions, by editing the problem, decomposing it into basic building
blocks, and defining the categories that allow to represent the problem. This process
leads different players to construct different representations of the problem and
therefore to adopt different solutions.   
Experiments show that players may discover different solutions according to the
training that they have received, and that they may remain locked in these solutions
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2even though this proves to be sub-optimal. This lock-in effect is explained in terms of
“routinized thinking”, and it is shown to be due to imperfect categorizations of the
problem.
In order to discover new solutions, individuals must re-define the categories with
which they describe the problem; this requires a process of abstraction and
specification involving the old categories, and allowing the creation of new basic
categories. It will be shown that this process is constrained and driven by the
emergence of unexpected exceptions, and therefore that, given the random emergence
of anomalies, the reconstruction of new categories is intrinsically biased. The search
for solutions is therefore described as an adaptive process driven by perceived errors
and essentially based on prejudices and their revision. These results are closely related
with Popper’s and Lakatos’ views of the creation of knowledge, and they also entail
that a new definition must be given to UDWLRQDOLW\ in evolutionary contexts, a definition
that will be discussed in the conclusions.
+XPDQGHFLVLRQVWKDWGHYLDWHV\VWHPDWLFDOO\IURPRSWLPDOEHKDYLRU
In recent decades, extremely fruitful reconciliation has taken place between
economics and psychology, inducing the former to accept more stringent criteria -
compared to those of the past - of empirical validation. These criteria are based on
recognition of the relevance of experiments which, especially in the field of individual
decision-making, have led to a rethinking of the role of decision theory, after a time in
which this theory and in particular expected utility theory was largely ascribed a
normative role as “logic of action”.
As Langlois (1998)  writes:
 “Although we may trace this tendency to Menger [..], it was probably Lionel
Robbins's Nature and Significance of Economic Science (1932) that fully
ensconced in the minds of economists the idea that their science is about the logic
of means and ends rather than about the psychology of utility.”
This view of the economic discipline had a particularly critical shortcoming: it
assumed that the majority of individuals always behave according to rational
strategies disregarding the limits to agents’ rationality.  By introducing the notion of
“bounded rationality” at the beginning of the 1960s, H. Simon emphasized that it is
unrealistic to attribute full rationality to decision makers when the computation of
their strategies is complex and requires great skill (which we cannot as a rule attribute
to all individuals).
The most notable and most successful attempt to overcome this difficulty was made
by Milton Friedman in the 1950s, with his proposal of the “as if” assumption.
Friedman (1953) claimed that the large majority of individuals in economic
institutions behave according to the fully rational strategies formulated by expected
utility theory, even if they do not possess the necessary calculation abilities. They do
so because competition induces them to behave “as if” they know the best course of
action.
Individuals learn optimal behaviors by trial and error; they “discover” increasingly
efficient strategies because of the effect of competition, which favors those subjects
whose behavior comes closest to the optimal one.
On this view it was implicitly assumed that individual deviations from optimal
behavior within a population were “errors” distributed according to the Gaussian
distribution. Because it was presumed that those adopting inefficient strategies would
3be progressively eliminated by economic competition, behaviors were supposed to
concentrate around the optimal one.
As economic theory attributed ever greater importance to expectations, Friedman’s
“as if” assumption relegated observation of the mental processes underlying economic
decisions to a very marginal position, despite the fact that expectations -that play a
fundamental role in Friedman view - are originated by agents on the ground of their
mental representations of the economy.
The most important challenge against this account was raised by March and Simon’s
organizational studies of the 1960s, which sought to understand how human
rationality effectively operates by conducting empirical observation of managers’
behaviors, expectations and opinions2. Despite the strong emphasis on the importance
of observing behaviors rather than mental processes,  in the years that followed Simon
developed methodologies with which to observe and simulate the mental processes
involved in decision-making and, in particular, strategy-building.
By gradually shifting the focus from real organizational contexts to “artificial”
environments like the game of chess, Simon proposed with Newell (1958, 1962),  an
analysis of strategic action which on the one hand gave rise to the theory of “problem
solving”, and on the other served as a platform for the empirical observation of
players’ decisions and thoughts.
The game of chess was chosen for experimentation because it required a very high
capacity for strategic calculation and could thus be used to establish the limits of
human rationality and of computation in artificial programs. In the 1970’s, Simon
developed his Protocol Analysis to investigate the problem-solving activities of
players engaged in a game. An experimenter employing this methodology records the
symbolic mental activity of a chess player by asking him to describe his thoughts in
detail as he constructs his strategies.
Empirical research in the directions opened up by Simon has demonstrated that the
“as if” assumption is untenable, because its main argument does not stand up to the
facts. Indeed, it can be shown that in conditions of high uncertainty, players’
strategies are not distributed around a single optimal strategy. Rather, they are fully
differentiated, so that it is impossible to identify the optimal strategy by means of
competition: in fact, competition in tournaments does not elicit the best strategy.
Analysis of chess, and of the way in which the players construct their strategies, thus
introduces two well known relevant aspects. The first, as well known, is that in many
circumstances it is not possible to calculate the optimal strategy, given the
computational complexity of the problem.4 The second is that the strategies chosen by
the players differ greatly: there is, for example, a wide variety of openings which
cannot be compared in terms of optimality.
 A first significant consequence thus emerges: even if an optimal strategy does exist,
we are at present unable to determine which opening comes “closest” to the optimal
strategy. Masters and skilled players choose from a wide variety of openings, without
there being a preference order among them. Hence, even if we were to record the
strategies used by the grand masters who win international tournaments, we could not
determine what the optimal strategy is.
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 Even though the existence of  a best strategy  can be demonstrated mathematically .
4Consequently, one assumption implicit in Friedman’s position is no longer valid,
namely that real behaviors are distributed “normally” around a behavior taken as
optimal by the theory. On the contrary, what we observe, at least in sufficiently
complex games, are systematic and permanent discrepancies amongst the various
strategies used by the players.
This phenomenon is very pervasive and can be found in many other fields where
human decisions are subjected to empirical verification. Systematic and permanent
discrepancies from the behavior predicted by the theory have been revealed by
experiments on deduction, reasoning and choice in conditions of uncertainty.
The experimental study of these activities is therefore important if we wish to
understand how individuals develop their strategies and apply them to real contexts.
Cognitive psychology, and the study of learning in particular, have thus become
frames of reference for the study of UDWLRQDOFKRLFH; for in order to understand how
decisions are taken, it is necessary to understand how human beings acquire
information and knowledge, and how they use them to build up their strategies.
The highly differentiated behavior observed in many important experimental
situations have given rise, since the 1970s, to  further theoretical proposals for
explaining human decision-making. Prospect theory, regret theory and other proposals
were first attempts to establish decision-making theory on new and different bases. To
date, empirical  comparisons of the predictions of these new theories has not
convincingly shown that one of them has greater explanatory capacity than the others:
each of them makes fairly accurate predictions in some experimental areas but fails to
make good predictions in others (Hey 1991).
Each of the new theories therefore has a limited domain of validity. Moreover, on the
one hand there are overlaps between the domains in which the predictions of
individual theories prove to be accurate, while on the other there are domains in
which no single theory furnishes satisfactory predictions.
Attempts to construct a new theory of decisions on the same epistemological criteria
that defined expected utility theory, by slightly modifying some of its axioms, have
failed to achieve clear and definitive results. The proposed generalization of expected
utility theory, where some axioms are weakened or replaced, is still based on the
epistemological assumption that decision theory is a “logic of action”. As said, this
was the position defended from Robbins to Friedman, on the belief that it is possible
to understand, and eventually to predict, real decisions, regardless of the
psychological features of mental activity.
I submit that these attempts have been unsuccessful because they ignore a profound
characteristic of decision-making activity: the interdependence between the decision-
making process and the PHQWDO UHSUHVHQWDWLRQ of the elements that give rise to the
decision.
The progress made in understanding the main cognitive processes - induction,
learning, categorization, framing, etc. – involved in human decision-making suggests
that clearer light can be shed on the process by investigating cognition. Little
modifications of  the axioms of the expected utility theory seems unable to obtain the
success desired, or to hold out the prospect of a future overall theory of decision-
making, because ignore the complexity of the underlying psychological phenomena.
                                                
5The cognitive processes involved in decision-making should not be ignored because
in many respects they determine the decision itself. The foremost example of this
connection has been provided by Kahnemann and Tversky’s experiments on
“framing effects”, the best-known of which, verified by an extremely wide range of
experiments, shows that individuals are averse or favorable to the risk inherent in a
decision according to how this decision is presented to them. If it is presented in such
a way that they codify it as a loss situation, they are favorable to risk, and vice versa
they are averse to risk if they perceive it as a gain.
A potentially successful research strategy is therefore one which acknowledges the
importance of the mental representations of the elements on which individuals
decide.6 In order to understand the individual decision-making process, therefore, it is
essential to understand how the elements of the decision are codified and represented
in a “mental model”, and how knowledge is organized by individuals and used in
decision making. The most promising point of departure is thus the field of problem
solving, reasoning, representation and categorization.
This paper will not attempt to address these topics, which are extremely broad in their
scope. Rather, it will concentrate on a point that appears to have a close bearing on
how the representation of problems can be characterized. It will examine the problem
of “cognitive traps”, i.e. those situations in which different individuals faced with the
same problem discover and adopt different solutions and persist in the use of those
solutions even when they prove to be inefficient.
&DWHJRULHVDQGDEVWUDFWLRQVLQWKHGHVFULSWLRQRISUREOHPV
Abstraction and classification are crucial elements in the process of building mental
representations of problems, that we will discuss in this section, avoiding
formalizations as possible.
When a solution to a problem is defined in a given context, it is usually defined on a
“domain” that comprises more than one simple element. For example, the definition
of “winning configuration” in chess implies a large (and unknown) number of
different configurations, all of which have the same property: the king must be under
definitive attack, i.e. unable to avoid attack in one move.
Finding a solution to a problem  – for example finding a winning strategy in chess  –
means discovering a procedure to achieve one element in a set –(the set of final
winning positions) whatever strategy the opponent chooses. A similar and simpler
definition holds for puzzles, the Rubik cube for example: here, finding a solution
requires finding a procedure with which to achieve one element in the set of final
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6winning configurations starting from the initial configuration. In the case of the Rubik
cube, the final winning configuration may be one specific configuration: for example
the one in which every face (side) is consists of tiles of the same color. Or it may be
defined as a class of configurations: for example, configurations in which every face
is composed half by tiles of one color and half by ones of another.
The  level of abstraction at which WKH SUREOHP LV GHILQHG has an important relation
with the level of abstraction at which a SURFHGXUH WR VROYH WKH SUREOHP may be
defined. It is important, in fact, to understand under what conditions it is possible to
define procedures that apply to the full domain of the problem; indeed, one of the
main aspects of the “art” of a programmer is the ability to construct a procedure
whose degree of abstraction fits perfectly with the domains of the problem.
Some definitions will help clarify the matter. A SX]]OH is a game in which an
individual must achieve a given goal, usually by making changes to an initial
configuration according to a system of rules and constraints. The rules state what
actions may be made for each state of the game, and what their effects will be. A
puzzle is therefore defined by the configurations, and by the rules that operate on the
configurations.
An important type of problem in the world of puzzles consists in achieving a given
configuration (or a configuration that belongs to a class characterized by some
property).  A problem can therefore be defined by the rules of the puzzle and a pair of
sets: the set of initial I and the set of final F configurations. A solution is a procedure
(or a program, i.e. a set of condition-action rules coherent with the rules of the puzzle)
that enables some element of F to be achieved starting from I.
The question of UHSUHVHQWDWLRQ immediately arises in these contexts. Assuming that
we discover a strategy S(x, y) that solves the problem, S is a program that enables the
player to achieve the configuration y ‡ F starting from x ‡ I. It may happen that S
holds for only one pair x,y ‡ FxI, for many pairs, or for all pairs x,y ‡ FxI. The art of
a good programmer consists in constructing S in such a way that the “domain of
applicability” of S is perfectly coincident with the two sets I, F that define the
problem.
Without loss of generality  we can assume that every state of the game, excluding the
goal configuration(s) may be a starting state.  A case in point is the Rubik cube, a
game in which the player must be able to achieve a final configuration whatever the
starting configuration may be. There are millions of configurations in this game, and a
program consisting of one instruction for each configuration would be accordingly
enormous. A desirable program is there one composed by a relatively small set of
abstract instructions each of which applicable to a group of configuration. The
creation of a program is then limited by two important desirable properties: on the one
hand, the simplicity of representation: the program should be composed by as low as
possible number of instructions. On the other, the efficiency: the number of steps to
execute a program should be as small as possible. We will show in the following
example that, at least in puzzles, there is a trade-off between simplicity and efficiency.
This trade-off  defines the constraints on which the discovery of new solutions
proceeds.
Assume that, given a problem I, F we discover a strategy S(x, y) that solves the
problem for all x ‡ F,  y ‡ F. With each pair x, y ‡  I x  F we can associate a payoff, a
measure of the efficiency of the problem-solving strategy. A very elementary measure
is a (monotonically decreasing) function of the number of steps executed by applying
the procedure: the higher the number of steps, the less efficient the procedure.
7The figure below depicts two strategies S and S* which solve the same problem with
different degrees of efficiency: in some sub-areas of the set,  S is more efficient than
(preferable to) S*, (S fi S*), while in the complementary areas S* is vice versa
preferable to S.
In these conditions, which frequently occur in games and puzzles, there are two
different strategies applying to different sub-domains. Players must pay the price of
greater mental effort to learn more strategies if they want to achieve optimality in
execution of the procedure.
Fig. 1
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Of course this situation can be generalized, in the sense that it may happen that many
different  strategies, S. S’, …Sn can be defined, each of which is optimal only in one
limited part of the domain of applicability.
Returning to the Rubik cube, it is evident that an optimal solution exists, i.e a path of
minimal length connecting every initial configuration with the goal configuration.
This optimal program can be described at “ground level”, i.e. by detailing an
instruction for every configuration, and of course this description would imply an
enormous number of instructions. Despite this obvious disadvantage, however, if a
program is described with this “ground” representation, its efficiency can be improved
very simply. In fact, it can be shown 11 that – despite a positive level of interaction
(epistasis) - the optimal program can be found by simple “mutations” i.e. by
modifying every instruction sequentially until the optimal set of instruction is
discovered.
Of course this is QRW the way individuals proceed when constructing a program to play
Rubik, or to solve similar puzzles. They try to compact the representation, i.e. to find
rules that are applicable to classes of configurations. At the ground level an
instruction consists of a configuration of the game and the action to be taken; at a
more abstract level, we can identify classes of configurations with the same role in the
game, i.e. to which we want to apply the same action.
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8Assume that we want to construct a program compactly, i.e. by identifying  classes of
configurations to which appropriate actions apply. These classes can be called
“building blocks” constructed by abstraction or codification from the game properties.
In the case of the Rubik cube, for example, in order to achieve the final position in
which every face has tiles of the same color, a player may try first to put the top
corners in their right places. Given the disposition of the colors of one of the top
corners, the player tries to put the second one in a position coherent with the first
corner (see Fig. 2). It is clear that the directions to move the  second top corner to its
right position disregard all the positions of the other tiles.
Fig 2.
This means that players consider an enormous number of configurations -  all those
with the second top corner in the same position – to be equivalent. They will define
the rules to apply only looking at the position of the second top corner, and will
therefore consider all the configurations with the first and the second top corners in
the same position as a single building block. The players will consequently perform
the same action for every configuration of the same building block.
A strategy S (or program ) can be therefore described compactly as a list of building
blocks, to each of which is attached an action. Thus a complete program consists of a
list of relatively few instructions defined by the building blocks. Of course, the
definition of the building blocks relates to the division of the original problem into
sub-problems. A given set of building blocks describes the problem in its parts with
some degree of abstraction: it is therefore the basic component of a UHSUHVHQWDWLRQ
As we shall see in detail in section 5.3, constructing a basic system of building blocks
enormously simplifies the representation of the problem, and enormously reduces the
number of instructions. In so doing, it may introduce hidden errors, i.e. inefficiencies
in the program that solves the game due to the way in which  the problem has been
decomposed into building blocks. To see briefly how a wrong decomposition
introduces errors,  assume that we know the optimal program described at the ground
level: we have the list of the best actions to be performed for every configuration of
the system.  Assume that the best action for configuration xi is action ai, and the best
action for configuration xj is action aj; and assume that ai  aj . For a given
decomposition of the problem,  the two configurations xi xj  may belong to the same
building block. In this case, the same action must be applied to both of them, and it
therefore  will be impossible to achieve the optimal solution.
9When a player modifies one instruction in a “compacted” description of the program,
he changes the action to be performed in relation to a given building block. The
change is therefore applied to an entire set of configurations. Therefore, by
introducing building blocks, we restrict the set of possible elementary modifications
(mutations) that can be applied to a program. Hence, as we have shown, some
decompositions of the problem, necessarily lead to descriptions that do not
incorporate the optimal solution. This implies that for any given problem there are
many  “wrong” decompositions. These decompositions are in some sense the result of
an excessive abstraction, or extrapolation.
This explains how it is possible for many sub-optimal strategies S, S’,… to coexist:
these strategies are simplified descriptions of the problem based on “wrong”
decompositions of the problem. As we shall see in more detail in the next sections,
these strategies are locally stable and sub-optimal for some configurations of the
domain. Therefore players that learn and adopt one of them may remain trapped in
this representation.
&RJQLWLYHWUDSVDWLQGLYLGXDODQGWHDPOHYHO
I have shown that sub-optimal strategies S, S’,.. in puzzles originated from “wrong”
decompositions of the problem, and that only changes in representations enable
players to achieve the optimal solution in the full domain of applicability. Moreover,
the players may not perceive the errors  (sub-optimalities) introduced by the
decomposition that they discover. The domain from which they induce a
decomposition may in fact be restricted to configurations for which the decomposition
LVRSWLPDO, as we have seen in Fig.1.
These properties of problem solving can be experimentally explored. The experiments
now briefly described illustrate biases in human behaviors on the basis of the
theoretical approach previously outlined.
In the experiments described, groups of players were exposed to different sets of
configurations for a training period. For each set of configurations Di it was possible
to discover a  simplified strategy which was optimal in that limited domain. Each
group of players learnt the simplified strategy in the particular domain to which was
exposed, and remained locked in its specific strategy, using it beyond the domain of
optimality.
 The first example of this kind of experiment was proposed  by Luchins (1942),
Luchins and Luchins (1950): individuals exposed to simple mathematical problems
admitting different solutions, S and S* tended to use the strategy that they learnt first
(in a context in which it was efficient) even in sub-areas in which a better strategy
could be found.
These experiments suggest that the automaticity with which players repeat the same
sequences of actions, solving a problem with a procedure that they have learnt in a
particular domain even in conditions in which that procedure is clearly suboptimal,
can be explained in terms of automaticity in their mental processes.  Luchins and
Luchins have argued in fact that routinized behaviors are based on URXWLQL]HGWKLQNLQJ
- the so-called "Einstellung effect" - or the  automatic use of "chunks" which enables
individuals to save on mental effort (Weisberg 1980) but which at the same time
induces them to cling to solutions for problems even when they prove to be sub-
optimal.
10
These findings have close analogies with the properties of problem-solving in team
contexts explored by Cohen and Bacdayan (1994) and Egidi and Narduzzo (1997) on
the basis of experiment using the game Target The Two. These experiments suggest
that the “Einstellung effect” holds even with regard to team decision-making: when
solving a repetitive task, for example by repetitively playing the same game, groups
of players adopt routinized behaviors and persist in their use with remarkable stability
even when they are clearly suboptimal .
The routinization of behavior may be considered the outcome of a process of mental
effort-saving that originates in the process of discovering and representing a strategy.
During this process, individuals make systematic use of GHIDXOW FODVVLILFDWLRQV to
reduce the short-term memory load and the complexity of symbolic manipulation. The
result is the construction of an imperfect PHQWDO UHSUHVHQWDWLRQ of the problem that
nevertheless has the advantage of being simple and yielding “satisficing” decisions.
This view is illustrated by the previous example in which we supposed that if many
strategies S, S’… Sn  apply with different degrees of efficiency to sub-domains of a
given problem, a trade-off will arise between the simplicity of the problem’s
representation and its efficiency.
The existence of this trade-off has been experimentally confirmed  by some of the
results obtained using the game 7DUJHW7KH7ZR, which I now briefly describe.
7DUJHW WKH7ZR is a card game in which the two players must cooperate in order to
achieve the final result. Each pair receives a reward proportional to the efficiency of it
play: that is, the fewer the moves made by a pair to achieve the result, the higher its
reward. Tournaments are organized in which pairs of players compete against each
other. In each round of the tournament the cards are distributed randomly, and the
players must learn how to coordinate themselves in the most efficient manner, but
without communicating verbally. There are two sub-optimal strategies, which I shall
call A and B, each of which is optimal with respect to a restricted domain of initial
configurations. For games which begin with initial configurations belonging to a
certain set α, strategy A dominates strategy B; while for games that begin with initial
configurations belonging to a certain set β, strategy B dominates strategy A. The two
domains α and β have a part in common: that is, there are initial configurations with
respect to which the two strategies are equally efficient.
   Table 1 shows the number of moves required by each strategy for every
configuration of the game. Arranged along the horizontal axis are the different game
configurations (there are 124 structurally different configurations), and along the
vertical one the number of moves required to achieve the result using strategy A and
strategy B. Immediately apparent are the three domains in which A dominates B
(from configuration 1 to 40), in which B dominates A (from 80 to 124), and in which
A and B are equivalent (from configuration 40 to 80).
Table 1
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   An experiment conducted by the present writer with A. Narduzzo (1997) showed
that pairs of players may become trapped in a sub-optimal strategy, without learning
the optimal one, even in conditions where the optimal strategy is easy to discover.
Two groups of players – Ga and Gb –  were formed, and each of them participated in a
tournament consisting of two parts. In the first part, group  Ga was exposed to hands
in which strategy A was dominant and also easy to learn. Likewise Group Gb was
given hands that could be easily played with strategy B, which was dominant. In the
second part of the tournament both groups were given the same configurations,
chosen at random. The results showed a persistent difference in behavior: the players
in group Ga used strategy A much more frequently than did players in group Gb, even
when the strategy was dominated by the other one, and vice versa. Table 2 shows this
persistence of  behavior. The horizontal axis shows the runs (after the training period)
in which both groups were given the same game configurations. The vertical axis
shows the percentage of pairs which used strategy A respectively in group Ga and
group Gb. (On the horizontal axis are the different runs). In each of the two groups
there was a rather high percentage of players who consistently used a single strategy,
the one learnt during the game training phase, so that the figures continued to differ
throughout the rest of the tournament.
Table 2
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 With regard to the behavior of individual pairs, a relevant percentage of pairs in
group Ga only used strategy A in all game conditions, and the same behavior was
displayed by group Gb.12 Consequently, we may call the behaviors of these players
‘routinized’ because they invariably used the same strategy, ZLWKRXW learning the
alternative strategy even though it was more appropriate.
This experiment raises the question of whether the systematic bias was caused by an
interaction effect – for example, elements due to the difficulty of cooperating – or
whether it was the result of individual routinized thinking. In order to clarify the
matter, I conducted an experiment identical to the previous one in which the sample
was similarly structured and the same sequence of games was played, but with the
difference that only single players, instead of pairs, played the game. The
coordination problem, and implicit communication between the players (they were
not allowed to communicate explicitly), were thus eliminated. In this experiment, too,
there were two groups of players – Ga and Gb – who were initially given 15 card
sequences in which strategy A and strategy B were respectively dominant, and then
both groups were exposed to the same sequence of randomly selected hands.
   The results were quite clear. In this game, too, players in group Ga continued to
prefer strategy A even when it was dominated by strategy B, and vice versa the
players in group B.
Table 3
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   The  ‘lock-in’ effect therefore affected also single individuals. The findings of
Luchins and Luchins are thus confirmed in this particular context as well.
However, routinization was less marked than in the case of cooperating pairs, and the
number of routinized individuals was much lower and differently distributed than in
the previous experiment with pairs. At least in this context, therefore, the coordination
process reinforces “deviations” from the olympic rationality that characterize
individual behaviors. In a context of tacit knowledge in particular, the difficulty of
coordination is largely responsible for the persistence of cognitive and behavioral
biases in a team.
   Although generalizing this result would require a much larger body of empirical
data, we nevertheless have interesting evidence of the considerable extent to which
difficulties in coordination reinforce the barriers that individuals encounter when
trying to get out of a cognitive trap. It is interesting to note that the difficulties of team
problem-solving seem analogous to those observed in the above story about Fermat’s
Last Theorem.
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%XLOGLQJEORFNVORFDOVWDELOLW\VXERSWLPDOLW\RIUHSUHVHQWDWLRQV
The extrapolation evidenced by the experiments on Target The Two is a general
feature of the problem-representation process which gives rise to systematic
imperfections and biases. The imperfections originate from the process of
constructing the categories which represent the building blocks of the problem’s
solution. To find a solution, in fact, individuals normally try to decompose a problem
into parts to be solved separately. Every decomposition is based on a categorization of
the problem, so that different decompositions may be characterized by different
abstraction levels of the categories (some abstraction levels may ignore some of the
interdependencies among the sub-problems).
In analogy with the example of many strategies S, S’, .. Sn, raising the level of
abstraction with which a sub-problem is represented means extending the domain of
validity of the categories and their relations  HYHQEH\RQGWKHILHOGLQZKLFKLWKDVEHHQ
H[SHULHQFHG E\ WKH LQGLYLGXDO, with the consequence that domains in which the
solution is inefficient may be unintentionally included. The onset of errors in the
mental representation of a problem may therefore be the "natural" effect of attempts to
simplify the categorization and identification of the building blocks of a problem.
Moreover, experiments on individual and team behavior provide a basis on which the
persistency of biases can be explained. Persistency of biases can be interpreted as the
existence and stability of suboptimal solutions to problems due to the difficulty of
redefining the sub-problems that constitute the elementary building blocks of the
problem’s representation. These elementary building blocks are based on system of
categories that, as will be shown in the next section, focus the players’ attention and
drive the construction of their mental models.
The division of knowledge derives from the way in which individuals categorize
problems during the training or learning phase. It should be stressed that a given
problem may be decomposed in a large variety of different ways which also give rise
to different levels of abstraction in the categorization of sub-problems. Every
decomposition pattern results from a different manner of codifying information at
different levels of abstraction.
In (Egidi, 2002) the optimal decomposition of a problem - the discovery of a strategy
for playing the game Minirubik - is compared with other decompositions which are
simpler and easier to learn but sub-optimal . We describe again the example of
Minirubik, to show the properties of local stability and sub-optimality of the solutions.  
Minirubik is a sort of Rubik square. The player has a square consisting of four
differently colored tiles denoted by the letters A,B,C,D.
Table 4
’ %
& $
The tiles can be exchanged horizontally or vertically, as shown in  Table 5, and
players must exchange them until they have achieved a final configuration.
Table 5
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’ % 83! % ’
& $ & $
’ % ’2:1! ’ %
& $ $ &
’ % 5,*+7! ’ $
& $ & %
’ % /()7! & %
& $ ’ $
Players are rewarded according to the number of moves that they make to achieve the
goal: the higher the number of the moves, the lower the payoff.
With this simplified representation, a strategy can be represented as a list of
condition-action instructions of the type exemplified in Table 6.
Table 6
&RQGLWLRQ $FWLRQ
’ % 8S
$ &
To simplify the description, a configuration can be written as a sequence of four
letters (or colors), rather than as a square of four letters (or colors), by applying the
following rule: start from the upper left corner of the square and list the elements of
the square, moving clockwise. With this rule the square in Table 4, for example, is
transformed into the list DBCA and the instructions for Table 6 can be written as
DBCA¯Up.
Following Holland (1975), the symbol #  is used synonymously with  “don’t care”,
which means that a configuration like A##C is an abstract configuration representing
the set of configurations in which A is in the first position (upper left corner) and C in
the last one (lower left corner). The symbol # allows us to represent sets of
configurations, i.e. to represent configurations at some level of abstraction.
Suppose that the initial and the final configuration are given respectively by the two
strings BDAC and ABCD, as in Table 7.
Table 7
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6WDUWLQJ *RDO
FRQILJXUDWLRQ &RQILJXUDWLRQ
% ’ $ %
& $ ’ &
A program with which to move from this particular starting configuration to the final
goal configuration consists of the following instructions:
 Move A from the initial position clockwise to the final position
 If B it is not yet in the final position, move it to the upper right corner OHDYLQJ A in its
position.
 If C and D are not yet in the required final positions, exchange them.
It is clear that we have constructed this set of instructions by following a KHXULVWLF , or
in other words, by following criteria for the decomposition of the original problem
into sub-problems involving related levels of abstraction and categorization of the
problem. These criteria are based on the idea of focusing on the position of one tile at
a time (first we move A, then B and finally C). This implies the following two points:
First, categorization: we have implicitly adopted a “categorization” of the problem:
the elements of our reasoning are the categories A###, #A##, ##A#, ###A, A#B#,….
and we mentally manipulate them.
Second, interdependence : the instructions proposed are based on the conjecture that it
will be possible to solve the problem by considering the movement of each tile,
disregarding the effects that the change of position of one tile has on the others and
therefore detecting rules that apply to the simple categories defined above.
By decomposing each of the three above instructions into elementary actions, we can
rewrite it as an array of elementary instructions (in the form of conditions-actions) as
follows:
Table 8
&RQGLWLRQV $FWLRQV
  5LJKW
 $
 $ 8S
 
$  5LJKW
 %
$ % ’RZQ
’ &
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We may wander whether it possible to arrange these instructions into a more general
format, maintaining the solution criteria that we have adopted (i.e. focusing on the
positions of one tile at time)  and successfully apply it to all  starting configurations of
the game. The answer is positive: by means of simple reasoning13 it is possible to
extend the  previous instructions to a broader domain, namely the set of all initial
configurations. We obtain the array of Table 9, which applies to every initial
configuration and enables players to achieve the goal configuration.
Table 9
&RQGLWLRQV $FWLRQV
  5LJKW
 $
 $ 8S
 
$  5LJKW
 %
$ % ’RZQ
’ &
$  ’RZQ
% 
  /HIW
$ 
The first specific system of instructions (Table 8) drawn up to solve the initial,
VSHFLILF problem is a sub-set of the new system of instructions, which applies to HYHU\
initial condition.
The system of abstract rules in Table 9 is therefore complete, because the abstractions
allow us to cluster and classify all specific rules of the system into a few subsets : it is
a compact UHSUHVHQWDWLRQ of the rules of action. I have called this representation “First
A” because the “heuristic” of this system is to move first A, then B and finally C into
their goal positions.
We thus have VLPSOLFLW\LQWKHUHSUHVHQWDWLRQ of the procedure with which to solve the
entire class of problems. Unfortunately, however, we do not have full efficiency; in
fact, for some initial conditions, the procedure is sub-optimal14, as the following
example shows.
                                                
13
 Egidi, 2002, p.140
14
 Egidi, 2002, Appendix 2
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Table 10
’ & $ %
% $ ’ &
The optimal sequence here (Table 10), in fact, is DCBA¯ Right ¯DACB¯ Left¯
BACD¯ Up ¯ABCD, whereas the rules prescribed by our procedure generate the
sequence DCBA Right¯ DACB¯ Left¯ BACD ¯Up¯ ADCB ¯Down
¯ADBC¯ Right¯ ABDC ¯Down ¯ABCD, which is obviously made up of more
steps.
The simplified procedure S(x,y) that we have defined is optimal only in a sub-domain
of the initial conditions. Therefore, when adopting this procedure, players have the
advantage of a representation which is very simple and abstract and complete but at
the price of inefficiencies, because the number of moves required to achieve the goal
is higher then the optimal number.
Moreover, the First A representation is a compact list of instructions that is sub-
optimal and  locally stable:
Local Stability - The reader may like to perform the exercise, modifying the actions
corresponding to the list of conditions in Table 9, and verifying that the efficiency of
the programs worsen. This means that, given the representation of the problem
defined by the building blocks ###A, ##A#, #A##, A##B, A#B#, ABDC, the
instructions in Table 9 are a local optimum. When the instructions in the table are
modified, the program worsens, i.e. the number of moves required to achieve the goal
increases.
Sub-optimality – As shown, in correspondence to some configurations , for example
DCBA, the program in Table 9 is sub-optimal, i.e. there exists a path to the goal that
is shorter than the path defined by Table 9. We have seen that (local stability) every
list of instructions obtained by modifying the table worsens the situation. Therefore,
however we modify the instructions in the list, changing the actions to be performed
in relation to the conditions described in abstract in Table 9, we will never achieve the
(ground) optimal program.
This is therefore a clear example of the trade-off between simplicity of representation
and efficiency of the program: the programs generated by Table 9 show inefficiencies
in correspondence to some configurations, and a player adopting this representation
cannot avoid making these errors (inefficiencies) even if he tries to modify some the
actions. The only way to improve the efficiency of the program is to change the
representation.
Preliminary experiments  confirm that a large number of players exposed during the
initial runs of the game to configurations optimally solved by the Table 10’s strategy
will adopt this strategy, thereby committing systematic errors perfectly in line with
the table’s instructions.
Therefore ELDVHVHPHUJHIURPLQGXFWLRQ: players make a default classification of the
configurations to which they want to apply a rule(for example ##A#¯Right). Put
otherwise, they conjecture a rule that is supposed to apply to the entire domain
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defined by a category (##A#), without perceiving that the rule has, on the contrary, a
more limited domain of application. Perception of this limitation can only come with
experience, because the rule has been conjectured by a process of induction whereby a
player extends a rule discovered in a particular context to the entire domain.
It is evident that any division of a problem into sub-problems is based on a structure
conjectured in accordance with certain decomposition principles. The classifications
and abstractions elicited by these principles may embody hidden errors which cannot
be perceived without direct inspection.
 Finding these hidden errors, in fact, would require detailed examination of all the
existing rules: an extremely time-consuming task which would nullify all the
advantages of a concise representation. Consequently, individuals, precisely because
of the inductive nature of their search, do not actively seek to find exceptions to the
rules that they have established to solve the problem.
We can see from the MiniRubik example15 that, in order to correct the errors hidden
in abstract rules, LWLVQHFHVVDU\WREHJXLGHGE\HPHUJLQJH[FHSWLRQV. Any attempt to
discover those errors actively would require a fully detailed description of the game
configurations that nullified the “parsimony” of the induction-based inference and
pre-empt the effort to express the strategy simply.
The locally optimal (globally inefficient) solutions in which individuals may remain
trapped while analyzing a problem are therefore created by the limits to their capacity
to IDOVLI\WKHUXOHV that they have conjectured in all relevant domains and to discover
hidden errors. Precisely because they cannot discover exceptions, it is highly unlikely
that they will actively redefine the basic categories on which they have constructed
the solution, so that they may remain trapped in the given representation.
                                                
15
 Egidi 2002, Appendix 2
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Conclusions
In the last sections I have described experiments which shed light on the features of
the human search for solutions in complex artificial environments like complex games
and puzzles.These characteristics are strikingly similar to the features of  the human
activity of theory creation and modification. I shall therefore conduct further
comparison between the two intellectual domains of problem solving and
epistemology.
In problem–solving, two basic elements drive the search for solutions: induction -
based on conjectures - by which individuals extend specific cases to wider domains,
and specification, the opposite process elicited by emerging errors.
Players in complex games do not represent all possible configurations in their minds.
Rather, in general, they proceed by generalization on the basis of examples: which
means that they seek to induce general rules from specific experiences, as happens for
example with children naturally learning a new language.
Induction is closely related to default classification (Holland, 1988). When a player
extends the domain of the validity of a rule discovered in a specific domain as widely
as possible, he classifies by extension all conditions that match the specific example
by assuming that they are the right conditions for application of the given rule. This
procedure enables players to create a complete - albeit highly suboptimal – initial
strategy, in which the rules of action for a large number of configurations are defined
“by induction” from examples. The extrapolation can also be viewed as a GHIDXOW
FODVVLILFDWLRQ.
When a new configuration occurs, eliciting a new rule as an exception, in general it
gives rise to a new rule that is PRUHVSHFLILF than the default one. A problem arises in
extending the new specific rule, i.e. in extrapolating to larger domains, because this
extrapolation will FRQIOLFW with the previous system of rules.
The problem is that adding one exception to a system of abstract rules does not yield a
new, compact representation of the strategy, because if individuals transform a
specific exception into a new rule with some degree of generality, the new rule may
conflict with many other preexisting rules of the strategy.
It follows that individuals may prefer to maintain the old system, perhaps adding few
exceptions, rather than devising new abstract rules, because the mental effort required
to redefine a sub-problems system is greater than that required to memorize an
exception. If the number of “exceptions” grows too large, and if they systematically
occur during the game, the players cannot simply continue to memorize new
exceptions; they must instead restructure the space of the rules, re-codifying
information. In other words, they must change the representation; a change which
may be highly discontinuous because it generally entails de-structuring the division of
problems and re-designing the problem with new building blocks. (Changing the
representation may be particularly difficult if it requires  redefinition of too many
basic sub-problems). This is of course an extremely onerous mental task, so that it is
likely that the new example will be treated as an anomaly, without prompting re-
categorization of the problem.
Sub-optimal solutions are therefore stable under the emergence of exceptions because
changing the representation while maintaining a limited number of general rules
requires radical modifications to the building blocks - the elementary sub-problems -
of which a strategy is composed.
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I suggest that the properties of problem-solving illustrated in this paper can be
extended by analogy to the world of competing theories. When we compare the
explanatory capacities of two competing theories (for example expected utility and
regret theories), we do so in the area where the domains of the two theories overlap:
that is, we conduct the comparison by referring to the “facts” to which both theories
apply. Comparison between two theories in a domain in which both are applicable
should normally be feasible. The only serious problem that may arise concerns the
difficulty of determining which theory is best solely on the basis of experimental data
- as happens, for example, in certain comparisons between  expected utility and regret
theory (Hey, chapter 5),  when the statistical tests are of insufficient power to yield
clear-cut results. More interestingly, it may happen that the core statements of a
theory have domains to which they have never been applied: the emergence of
anomalies, i.e. unexpected examples in the theory’s domain of applicability that
contradict it, giving rise to a dynamic of change analogous to the dynamic of problem
solving. As illustrated earlier, this process of revision requires a new decomposition
based on a new categorization of the elementary building blocks of the problem (the
theory). I have suggested that the failure (to date) of attempts to find  a satisfactory
new theory of decision-making, on the basis of slight modifications to the classical
axioms of expected utility theory, has been due to the extreme simplification of the
basic axioms, which do not take serious account of the main features of human
thinking.
Turning to epistemology, as far as the modification of a theory can be considered a
problem-solving question, the features displayed by the search for new solutions in
problem-solving entail critical revision of Popper’s idea of falsifiability in the light of
Lakatos’ position: any anomaly, or element of falsification, reduces a rule’s domain of
applicability, but it does not necessarily allows re-definition of all the sets of
interrelated abstractions (a hierarchical system of categories) that made up the
previous solution. This may come about as result of the cumulative effect of the
random emergence of many anomalies. In this case, anomalies drive the process of re-
categorization and induce individuals to adopt new solutions which are once again
locally stable, albeit imperfect. The experiments described in this paper may aid
understanding of why theories and ideologies persist over long periods of time with
remarkable stability when they have been largely falsified, and of what processes
induce individuals to discard previous theoretical approaches. Re-definition of the
categories constituting the building blocks of a solution (a theoretical approach)
requires the complex process - what Popper calls “critical thinking” -  that I have tried
to describe.
Prejudices and erroneous simplifications are therefore natural and necessary for the
creation of new solutions. Rationality emerges essentially as the capacity to get rid of  
our prejudices.16
                                                
16
 In  (1994), Popper defines rationality as the attitude of eliminating errors in a critical way.
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